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RECENT DECISIONS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LA.w-CML RIGIITS-REsTRICTIONS ON THE UsE OF 
LEGAL MATERIALS BY PRISONERS-Plaintiff prisoners brought separate actions 
against the warden of the Oregon State Penitentiary, alleging that the en-
forcement by prison officials of restrictions on the availability, use and 
purchase of law books resulted in a denial of full access to the courts. It was 
further alleged that each of them must do by himself all or part of the legal 
preparation necessary to contest his detention or to defend criminal charges 
pending against him in a state or federal court. In proceedings brought in 
the federal district court under the Civil Rights Act1 to enjoin further 
enforcement of these restrictions, held, £or plaintiffs. Denial of access to 
courts constitutes a deprivation of civil rights of prisoners, and the study 
of law cannot be restricted where this is necessary to the utilization of a 
basic right. Bailleaux v. Holmes, (D.C. Ore. 1959) 177 F. Supp. 361. 
It is recognized that lawful imprisonment brings about the necessary 
withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights.2 Thus, in the in-
terest of prison discipline, it has been held that prison officials have broad 
powers to censor both incoming and outgoing mail, even when this mail 
consists of legal documents or correspondence between prisoners and their 
attomeys,s and that the officials have power to supervise and curtail the 
business affairs of prisoners.4 Likewise, prisoners have no absolute right to 
plead and manage their own cases personally on appeal5 and no un-
restricted right to file civil actions.6 Beyond limitations on privileges neces-
sary for prison discipline, however, conviction and incarceration deprive a 
prisoner of only those liberties which the law demands he should lose as 
the penalty for his crime.7 The fact that a person is in prison, therefore, 
does not deprive him of the right to invoke the provisions of the Civil 
Rights Act for the protection of rights guaranteed by the federal govem-
ment.8 
1 Action was brought under 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. (1958) §1983, which provides 
a civil remedy for the deprivation of rights by persons acting under color of law, and under 
28 U.S.C. (1958) §1343, which vests jurisdiction in the federal district courts over civil 
actions commenced by any persons for the redress of rights given under the Constitution 
or Acts of Congress. See comment, 56 MICH. L. REv. 619 (1958) and note, 58 MICH. L. R.Ev. 
786 (1960) for general discussions of the Civil Rights Act. 
2 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948). 
3 E.g., Adams v. Ellis, (5th Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 483; Dayton v. Hunter, (10th Cir. 
1949) 176 F. (2d) 108; Green v. State of Maine, (S.D. Me. 1953) 113 F. Supp. 253 (corre-
spondence with attorney); Commonwealth ex rel. Langley v. Myers, (Pa. Com. PI. 1956) 
73 Montg. 159 (legal documents). 
4 United States ex rel. Wagner v. Ragen, (7th Cir. 1954) 213 F. (2d) 294; Stroud v. 
Swope, (9th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 850. 
5 Price v. Johnston, note 2 supra. 
6 Tabor v. Hardwick, (5th Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 526. 
7 Coffin v. Reichard, (6th Cir. 1944) 143 F. (2d) 443. 
8 Siegel v. Ragen, (7th Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 785; McCollum v. Mayfield, (N.D. Calif. 
1955) 130 F. Supp. 112. State prison officials, enforcing prison discipline, clearly act under 
color of state law and their actions therefore fall within the scope of the Civil Rights Act. 
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In the principal case the guaranteed right sought to be protected is 
that of access to the courts, a right which has been previously recognized 
by the United States Supreme Court.9 Two leading cases in which the 
right has received protection hold that the right is violated by denying 
prisoners access to the courts, unless such prisoners procured counsel to rep-
resent them,10 and by prison regulations which restricted the right to 
apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.11 In holding that the 
right is violated by restrictions on the study of law and use of legal materials 
in a state prison, the court in the principal case has gone one step further in 
the protection of this right. The restrictions struck down in the principal 
case, however, are much more closely connected with prison administration 
and discipline than those in the earlier cases, and to this extent the decision 
represents a reversal of the traditional reluctance of federal courts to inter-
fere with the administration of state prisons. It is frequently said that it is 
not the function of the courts to supervise the treatment and discipline of 
prisoners and therefore relief against enforcement of prison rules and regu-
lations must be denied.12 This position is undoubtedly taken because 
discipline is one of the great problems of prison administration. But 
balanced against discipline problems is the care that must be taken to insure 
the right of a prisoner to be able effectively to contest the validity of his 
confinement and to safeguard against abuses of this right by prison officials. 
In this regard, access to courts might be as effectively denied by unreasonably 
preventing the preparation of legal documents as by preventing their filing. 
However, the competing considerations of the need for prison discipline 
as opposed to the protection of the basic rights of prisoners would seem to 
call for a closer analysis of the facts and actual operation of the restrictions 
Gordon v. Garrson, (E.D. Ill. 1948) 77 F. Supp. 477. Protection of these rights might also 
be secured by the writ of habeas corpus, but several limitations have been placed upon its 
use for after-trial deprivations of rights. See comment, 33 NEB. L. REv. 434 (1954). 
~ See CORWIN, CoNSTITUTION OF nm UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1137 (1953); Ex parte 
Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945). 
10 White v. Ragen, note 9 supra. It has also been held that suppression of the papers 
necessary for an appeal until the time for filing an appeal has passed is a denial of equal 
protection under the laws. Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); 
Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942). However, no rights are violated by the failure to 
take affirmative action to aid in the filing of an appeal. Hill v. United States, (6th Cir. 
1959) 268 F. (2d) 203. 
11 Ex parte Hull, note 9 supra. But see Commonwealth ex rel. Sharp v. Day, 89 Pa. 
D. &: C. 605 (1954). 
12 E.g., Eaton v. Bibb, (7th Cir. 1954) 217 F. (2d) 446; Curtis v. Jacques, (W.D. Mich. 
1954) 130 F. Supp. 920. Thus, courts have denied relief from restrictions on the purchase 
of law books, Grove v. Smyth, (E.D. Va. 1958) 169 F. Supp. 852; the preparation of habeas 
corpus petitions for other prisoners, Siegel v. Ragen, note 8 supra; the application for 
correspondence courses, Numer v. Miller, (9th Cir. 1948) 165 F. (2d) 986; and the freedom 
from racial segregation in prison, Nichols v. McGee, (N.D. Calif. 1959) 169 F. Supp. 721. 
In other cases the courts have refused to enjoin the enforcement of restrictions on the 
study of law and the use of law books by prisoners. Piccoli v. Board of Trustees and 
Warden of State Prison, (D.C. N.H. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 672; Wilson v. Dixon, (9th Cir. 
1958) 251 F. (2d) 338. 
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in each individual case than has heretofore been given by the courts in 
cases assessing the reasonableness of restrictions. In addition to considering 
the necessity of the restrictions for effective discipline, courts might give 
consideration to several related factors in making this analysis. First, if the 
prisoner requests greater freedom in the use of legal materials for the 
purpose 0£ preparing a defense to charges pending against him, a stronger 
case for an injunction against enforcement of restrictions is presented than 
if he wishes only to appeal his conviction1 3 or contest his current sentence 
or treatment. In matters relating directly to his liability for a crime, no 
person should be deprived of the best possible opportunity to vindicate 
himself, and the necessity for legal preparation is urgent in this situation. 
Second, restrictions which discriminate against the use of legal materials, 
solely for the reason that they are legal materials, would seem to be clearly 
unreasonable. Third, if the state makes provision for free legal assistance 
to indigent prisoners, this would be a strong factor in support of sustaining 
the prison restrictions.14 Finally, if the prisoner is able to afford outside 
legal counsel, restrictions on his use of legal materials are not likely to 
deprive him of full access to the courts. 
Russell A. McNair, Jr.,. S. Ed. 
13 A state does not have to provide appeal procedure, but if it does so it must do so 
indiscriminately and prisoners are denied equal protection under the laws if they are 
denied the right to appeal. Ortega v. Ragen, (7th Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d) 561; Boykin v. 
Huff, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 865. If a state provides for appeal as a matter of right, 
it cannot limit the right by requiring that appellant incur expenses beyond his means. 
Thus it is a denial of equal protection to refuse to furnish a transcript to indigents. 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The question whether counsel for appeals must be 
furnished indigents is unsettled. See State v. Delaney, (Ore. 1958) 332 P. (2d) 71, note, 58 
MICH. L. REv. 131 (1959). 
14 A recent statute enacted in Oregon provides for the appointment of free legal 
counsel to handle appeals and certain other post-conviction legal matters in Oregon courts 
for indigent prisoners. Ore. Laws (1959) c. 636. This type statute would have to be 
extended to encompass all types of post-conviction remedies and to relate to proceedings 
in federal courts and other state courts to provide complete relief. 
